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Severance*-A Means of Minimizing the Role
of Burden and Expense in Determining
the Outcome of Litigation
Warren F. Schwartz**
Professor Schwartz discusses the policy considerationsattendant upon
the use of severance as a means of achieving economy in litigation. He
rejects the notion that severance should not be used because it precludes
"tempering" of the substantive law by judge or jury by reference to
the "equitied' of the entire controversy. Finally, the author proposes a
statute which implements his resolution of the policy issues.
I. IN RODUCnTON

The problem of minimizing the burden and expense of litigation
without sacrificing the benefits derived from an informed resolution of
controversies is central to the continuing reappraisal of our procedural
system. There is general agreement that, expense and burden aside,
full exploration of the relevant facts in advance, a trial where
the witnesses actually appear and give testimony, and the fashioning

of rules of law with reference to the particularized trial record
are all concomitants of a legal process well conceived to achieve a

just resolution of controversies. 1 It seems clear then that the burden

and expense of litigation cannot be alleviated by any fundamental
limitation on the scope of discovery, nor by substituting, in a significant number of instances, summary determination for disposition
by trial. It is equally clear, however, that the very thoroughness and
care which we strive to achieve create a risk that litigation may
become a completely impractical method of resolving the vast major-,
ity of disputes which arise.
* The word "severance" is often used to mean that the issues selected for separate
treatment become the subject of a new action with separate docket, judgment, etc.
Here all that is meant is that the issues are selected for prior and separate trial.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. White Motor v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), in which the Court refused
to determine on a motion for summary judgment whether certain vertical restraints were
illegal per se under the antitrust laws. Similarly in Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates,
305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962), the court reversed an award of summary judgment
for defendant on the ground that the contract that was sought to be enforced was an
illegal sale of corporate control. Because of the many policy factors bearing on the
issue, the court stressed the necessity of a "more instructive" record. A number of
factors, the most important of which are the need to assess credibility by reference
to demeanor at trial and the normative element in the negligence standard, have combined to make summary judgment very rarely available in personal injury litigation.
See J. WEmNsTm, H. KoPN & A. MmLER, NEw YORM PRACTICE ff 3212.03 (1966).
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One possible approach which has received increasing attention is the
use of severance. 2 This idea is simple enough-the relevance of
certain issues is dependent upon the resolution of others. If there is a
substantial question concerning the issues upon whose resolution the
relevance of the others depends, attention should be directed to
these issues while holding the others in abeyance, thus perhaps
avoiding the necessity of litigating the dependent issues. At the same
time the complete litigation process from discovery through trial can
be brought to bear on the potentially dispositive or delimiting issues.
The use of severance to this end poses essentially two questions:
(1) Is the benefit derived from the saving which may be achieved
outweighed by the detriment which may result from duplication of
effort in the event that the first trial is not dispositive?
(2) Even if the balance of considerations, from the viewpoint of
efficiency, dictates severance, should severance be avoided because
neither judge nor jury can properly determine the limited issues without hearing the entire case?
The discussion of severance has centered on the second of these
questions. It is urged that judge and particularly jury are more than
neutral fact-finders; consequently they must be apprised of the
entire litigation so that they can "temper "3 the substantive law by
applying their notions of equity. This concept underlies threshold
2. This purpose of severance should be distinguished from other purposes which
underlie its use. These are: (1) The desire to avoid unduly protracted and complicated trials. See In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952),
aff'd sub nom. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Moss v. Associated
Transp., Inc., 33 F.R.D. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965).
(2) The desire to avoid prejudice. Compare Bowie v. Sorrell, 113 F. Supp. 373
(W.D. Va. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953) (dictum approving severance), with Larsen v. Powell, 16 F.R.D. 322 (D. Colo. 1954) (rejecting
contention that jury knowledge of insurance was prejudicial). (3) The desire to keep
legal and equitable issues separate. E.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); S.D. CODE
§ 33.1303 (Supp. 1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 270.08 (1957); The economy factor has
been isolated for two reasons: (1) the other considerations may be neutral and
severance is nevertheless justified, and (2) these other considerations never militate
against severance justified by considerations of economy. It may be, however, that in
a close case from the economy vantage point these added factors could justify severance.
3. This phrase is adopted from Professor Weinstein who was apparently the first to
raise the objection that severance was an impermissible regulation of matters of "substance" by the federal courts in diversity cases. After arguing that severance of liability and damage issues in personal injury cases is a matter of "substance," principally
because it interferes with the common practice of rendering compromise verdicts in
lieu of applying the rules of contributory negligence, Professor Weinstein distinguishes
and approves the use of severance with respect to defenses such as release on the
ground that: "Most of these ancillary issues involve precise dispositive questions which
can be relatively easily answered and in which the jury's power to temper the law
is minimal [footnotes omitted]." Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence
Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. Rv.
831, 843 (1961).
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objections to severance as (1) a denial of the constitutional right to
trial by jury, and (2) an impermissible regulation of substantive matters by federal courts in diversity cases where the state rule forbids
severance. Where severance was not permissible at common law, it
is argued that a trial of all issues with the attendant opportunity for
"tempering" forms an indispensable part of the right to trial by jury.
Similarly if "tempering" (as in the case of juries compromising contributory negligence questions by diminishing damage awards) forms
an essential part of the state law, it is a "substantive" matter beyond
the power of federal courts to alter by directing severance. With very
few exceptions, these arguments have been consistently rejected.
However, they have been given some indirect support by the recent
amendment to Federal Rule 42(b) (the principal federal rule authorizing severance).4 This amendment apparently stops short of unqualified approval of severance in the interests of economy because the
draftsmen thought these objections were of sufficient weight to preclude a clear-cut legislative decision at the present time.5 In any
event, a policy question remains: Do we want decisions by factfinders on limited and theoretically dispositive issues when they are
unaware of the essential nature of the controversy?
Determining when severance is justified from the vantage point
of its effect on the outcome of particular litigation has received
very little explicit attention. The commentators who have evaluated severance have adopted the alleviation of calendar congestion
as the principal end served by severance." They have, therefore,
turned their attention to the overall saving of litigation effort resulting from a regular practice of severance, and have amassed impres4. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(d), which specifies certain defenses which can be preliminarily
determined, provides the second principal source.
5. See text accompanying notes 30 and 31 infra.
6. Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 Hnv.
L. REv. 1606 (1963). This article makes an elaboiate statistical analysis of overall
time saving, in part responding to Professor Weinstein's suggestions that the possibilities
of economy had been exaggerated. Other commentators limit their consideration to
the question of severing liability and damage issues in personal injury cases and do not
focus on the effect of severance on the critical decisions affecting possible compromise. See Brault, The Issues of Liability and of Damages in Tort Cases Should Not
Be Separated for the Purposes of Trial, ABA INS. NEC. & COMPENSATION SEC. 274
(1960); Committee of State Courts of Superior Jurisdiction of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Separate Trials of the Issues of Liability and Damages
in Personal Injury Actions, 20 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 659 (1965); Vogel, The Issues
of Liability and of Damages in Tort Cases Should be Separated for the Purposes of
Trial, ABA INS. NEC. & COMPENSATION SEC. 265 (1960);

Note, Separation of Issues

of Liability and Damages in PersonalInjury Cases: An Attempt to Combat Congestion
by Rule of Court,46 IowA L. REv. 815 (1961); Note, Separate Trials on Liability and
Damages in "Routine Cases": A Legal Analysis, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1059 (1962).,
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sive evidence that such saving can be achieved.7 This approach, however, neglects the qualitative question of the likely effect of severance
on the result of a particular case. This question must not be ignored.
Inferior justice is too high a price to pay for expedition and economy.8
However, an expanded use of severance is possible without impairing
the judicial process; indeed it can be justified as substantially improving the quality of justice administered by minimizing the role of cost
and burden in determining the outcome of litigation. The desirability
of severance in a particular case should be measured by the likelihood
that it will achieve this end.
Therefore, this article is divided into two main parts. First, it is
assumed that the controlling question is how severance affects the
likely outcome of litigation by altering the normal incidence of expense and burden. Then the article examines the question of whether
there are overriding considerations (particularly the need for "tempering" by reference to the entire controversy) which require that severance be withheld even if dictated by considerations of economy.
II. SEVERANCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING ECONOMY

A. The Present Law

1. The FormalDimension.-In most jurisdictions there are no formal
limitations on the type of issues which can be severed. Rule 42(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state provisions
7. Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 6, at 1624, conclude that a net saving of 20% of
litigation time has been achieved by the practice employed in the Northern District of
Illinois of routinely severing liability and damage issues in personal injury actions.
Alleviation of calendar congestion was the principal ground for adoption of the
practice. The reasons leading to the enactment of the Northern District of Illinois
Rule are thoroughly explored in O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp.
577, 581-88 (N.D. Ill. 1960). See also Vogel, supra note 6, at 269; Note, MINN. L.
BEv., supra note 6. In support of this rule, the court noted the desirability of confining
the effects of jury sympathy and restricting the possibility of compromise verdicts
through severance. See O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., supra at 581, 585.
8. Professor Wright is highly critical of the fact that the effect on the quality of
justice administered has not been taken into account in the evaluation of the Northern
District of Illinois practice. Wright, The Federal Courts-a Centunj After Appomattox,
52 A.B.A.J. 742, 747 (1966).
9. See, e.g., A=uz. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (only state having already enacted the recent
amendment to Rule 42(b)); MD. R. Civ. P. 501; MINN. R. Civ. P. 42.02. California
has a statute which varies in wording but is equally broad. CAL. Civ. Pnoc. CODE § 1048
(West 1955). Illinois has the same provision. ILL. CrV. PRAc. AcT § 51 (1956).
Some states either have no statutory severance provision (Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island and Virginia), or one limited to multiple claims or multiple party situations.
ALA. EQ. R. 15 (multiple claims for "multifariousness"); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-97 (1960) (multiple claims; legal and equitable claims), 38 MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN.
ch. 231, § 4 (1959) (severance of persons joined as severally liable on contracts);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-179 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 558 (1960); S.C. CODE
§ 10-1202 (1962) (severance of claims against multiple defendants); S.D. CODE §

SEVERANCE

1201

authorize severance of "any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or thirdparty claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues." Every type of
issue has been severed. Thus, liability issues (as distinct from the
question of damages),1° a wide variety of affirmative defenses," and
33.1305 (Supp. 1960) (severance in multiparty litigation); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 270.08
(1957) (severance of claims against multiple defendants). Some courts have severed
and tried certain potentially dispositive issues first without express statutory authorization. Robertson v. Ephraim, 18 Tex. 118 (1856) (domicile of defendant on which
jurisdiction depended); Charron v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 143 Wis. 437, 128 N.W. 75
(1910) (release). The only case that has been found denying severance on the
ground of lack of statutory authority arose in Texas, which has a rule substantially
identical with the federal rule. See Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648
(1958) (strong dictum).
10. As has been indicated this is the general practice authorized by Rule 21 of the
Rules of Northern District of Illinois. See Note, IowA L. REv., supra note 6. Other
federal cases following the same practice without benefit of a specific rule include:
Nettles v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 234 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.
1956) (personal injury action in which several cases consolidated for trial on liability
issues); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 15 (S.D. Tex. 1963), aff'd, 336 F.2d 406
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965) (protracted patent infringement
action); Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 33 F.R.D. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd,
344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965) (necessary adjunct to consolidation of several cases arising
out of single occurrence for trial since damage issues of various claimants were essentially unrelated); Hahn v. Woodlyn Fire Co. No. 1, 32 F.R.D. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
(personal injury action in which court concluded that "plaintiffs themselves evidence
little assurance on the liability issues"); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Sheffield Corp., 31
F.R.D. 534 (D. Del. 1962) (protracted patent case); Richenbacher Transp., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 3 F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (proof of damages extremely complex, plaintiff seeks severance). State cases reveal the same practice. Mellone v. Lewis,
233 Cal. App. 2d 4, 43 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Vander Car v. Pitts, 166
So. 2d 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Mercado v. City of New York, 25 App. Div.
2d 75, 265 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1966); Hacker v. City, 25 App. Div. 2d 35, 266 N.Y.S.2d
194 (1966); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 67 Wash. 2d 278, 407 P.2d 461 (1965).
But of. Peasley v. Quinn, 373 Mich. 222, 128 N.W.2d 515 (1964) (indicating approval
only of a very limited use); Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648 (1958)
(strong dictum disapproving the practice).
11. These include: Release, Winchester Drive-in Theatre, Inc. v. Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp., 35 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Cal. 1964). Statute of limitations, Taxim v.
Food Fair Stores, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 457 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Drake v. Ming Chi Shek, 155
F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1957). Res judicata, Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distrib.
Co., 6 F.R.D. 222 (D. Mass. 1946). Laches, The Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co.,
177 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Ill. 1959) (trademark action in which factual issues relevant to
laches question were quite complex). Existence of contract complying with statute
of frauds, Canister Co. v. National Can Corp., 3 F.R.D. 279 (D. Del. 1943). Tort
Claims Act exemption for "damages from or by flood or flood waters;" Huffmaster v.
United States, 186 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1960). Realignment of parties to defeat
diversity jurisdiction, Carr v. Beverly Hills Corp., 237 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1956), reoed
on other grounds, 354 U.S. 917 (1957). Estoppel to contest patent by reason of
violation of license agreement, Air King Prods. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 10
F.R.D. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). Whether infringement of patent had been asserted upon
which justiciability of declaratory judgment action turned, Temp-Resisto Corp. v. Glatt,
18 F.R.D. 148 (D.N.J. 1955). "File wrapper estopper' in patent case, Aldridge v. General Motors Corp., 178 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Cal. 1959). Public use or sale in patent case,
Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1964),
aff'd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1966). Affirmative defenses severed for prior determi-
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parts of a plaintiffs case have all been severed for early trial. 2 In
fact, severance has never been denied on the ground that the nature

of the issue precludes its use.
There also is no limitation as to the stage at which severance can

be invoked. Although generally not sought until trial, it has sometimes
been employed quite early.' 3 Its effectiveness in the latter case has

also been greatly enhanced when the severance order is coupled with
a stay of all discovery and pre-trial proceedings other than with re4
spect to the issues severed for prior determination.'

2. The Standard for Balancing Potential Saving with Potential
Duplication.-The most critical factor in defining the scope of per-

missible severance is the standard applied in determining when potential saving outweighs potential duplication. The cases have not

adequately articulated that standard. The most frequent statement
of the rule, originally formulated by Professor Moore, obscures the
problem by stating, in effect, that any factual overlap between the
issues sought to be severed and the remaining issues precludes sever-

ance. Under this formulation, "A separate trial should not be granted
in a case [where severance of a potentially dispositive defense is

sought] unless the issue is clearly severable from the other issues in
the case and does not involve the same evidence."'15
nation in state courts include: Release, Burton v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 280
App. Div. 356, 113 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1952); Legate v. Urso, 216 A.2d 506 (R.I. 1966)
(strong dictum approving practice). Res judicata, Cardy v. Cardy, 14 App. Div. 2d 735,
220 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1961). Statute of limitations, Cardy v. Cardy, supra. Reformation,
Winthrop Prods. Corp. v. Damsky, 279 App. Div. 775, 109 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1952). Duress,
Perlman v. Cohen, 68 N.Y.S.2d 882 (App. T. 1947). See generally Note, Separate
Trial of a Claim or Issue in Modern Pleading: Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Practice, 39 Mnsm. L. REv. 743, 755 (1955).
12. E.g., Rossano v. Blue Plate Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1963) (question
of agency relationship between defendant and driver of vehicle in personal injury
action).
13. Fisher & Porter Co. v. Sheffield Corp., 31 F.R.D. 534, 539 (D. Del. 1962);
Huff-master v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Momand v. Paramount
Pictures Distrib. Co., 6 F.R.D. 222 (D. Mass. 1946).
14. Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co., 177 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Ill.
1959); Fisher &
Porter Co. v. Sheffield Corp., 31 F.R.D. 534 (D. Del. 1962); Momand v. Paramount
Pictures Distrib. Co., 6 F.R.D. 222 (D. Mass. 1946); Canister Co. v. National Can Co.,
3 F.R.D. 279 (D. Del. 1943).
15. 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PnAcrIcE 42.03, at 1217 (2d ed. 1964). The results of
the cases cited by Professor Moore do not clearly support so stringent a rule. Cf. Winkler
v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 810 (E.D.N.Y. 1940), where the
court did refuse to sever at plaintiff's request the issue of whether publication had
been accompanied by proper trademark notice, stating this issue was "an integral part
of plaintiff's affirmative case." Id. at 812. The case does not make it clear, however,
how much evidence relating to the remaining issues would have to be offered for the
disposition of the limited issue. Woburn Degreasing Co. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons,
37 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1941), although stating the restrictive language, actually
allowed severance of the issues of validity and infringement in a patent action. In
Suffin v. Springer, 1 F.R.D. 245, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), the court denied severance of
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Theoretically under this rule one would never reach the problem
of balancing since any risk of duplication would be *enough to preclude severance. It is clear, however, that many courts depart from

this rule and sever where substantial potential saving may be achieved
despite the existence of significant evidentiary overlap. It is difficult
to imagine any case in which a subsequent damage hearing will not
require proof of at least a substantial part of the facts upon which
liability was predicated. In addition, a number of affirmative defenses
have been severed despite a substantial factual overlap with the
merits.' 6 In the cases that grant severance despite a significant factual

overlap little attention is paid to the risk of duplicationP and consequently no effort is made to minimize it. In other cases, however,
the courts deny severance because of the existence of substantial potential duplication without taking account of the potential saving

which may also be present. Thus when exemplary damages may be
awarded, depending upon the jury's assessment of the gravity of de-

fendant's fault, severance has been denied because the damage jury
would have to rehear all the liability evidence. 1 8 Similarly, when because of a casualty problem the damage jury will have to hear the
liability evidence 19 or when evidence of injury relevant to a release
issue will have to be repeated on the merits2 0 severance has been denied.
The present law with respect to severance may be summarized as
conferring broad discretion on the trial judge concerning the issues

the issue of fraud as inducing a release because the issue cannot be heard "without
the introduction of proof pertinent to other issues." Although the opinion is not clear
this may well have been a case in which the misrepresentations relied on to avoid the
release were with respect to the claim allegedly released and forming the subject
matter of the action. In such a situation the fraud issue would turn in large part on
the actual facts concerning the claims so that the entire action would have to be tried
preliminarily for its bearing on the limited fraud issue.
16. See Locke v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 309 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1962); Cataphote
Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1964); Huffmaster v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Shorehan Village,
Inc. v. Bush Constr. Co., 185 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Seven-Up Co. v. O-So
Grape Co., 177 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. IM. 1959).
17. When the risk is explicitly noted it is simply characterized as insignificant.
Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1964),
aff'd, 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1966) (substantial factual overlap); Bernardo v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 200 F. Supp. 534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 314 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.
1963). Another factor explaining the apparently small weight sometimes assigned the
risk of duplication is the court's strong guess that the first hearing will be dispositive.
Courts directing severance frequently comment on the apparent-strength of the position
of the party seeking severance. E.g., Hahn v. Woodlyn Fire Co., No. 1, 32 F.R.D.
429, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ("plaintiffs themselves evidence little assurance on the liability issues").
18. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 924 (1961).
19. Culley v. City, 25 App. Div. 2d 519, 267 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1966).
20. Grissom v. Union Pac. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 263, 265 (D. Colo. 1953).
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which may be severed, the point in the litigation at which severance
may be invoked, and the ancillary orders in aid of severance which
may be issued. It is defective, however, in failing to articulate the
standard by which considerations of economy are to be measured.
Morerover, the courts have not responded to the necessity of balancing the potential economy of a prior dispositive hearing against the
inevitable duplication if the hearing is not dispostive.
B. The Basic Policy Issues

In order to frame the governing standard, it is necessary to consider the conflict between the possible economy achieved by severance and the possible impairment of the quality of justice caused
by duplication.
The initial premise is that litigation should be determined either
by application of the governing substantive law or by compromise
based upon factors which are socially desirable. If the parties agree
in their assessments of the merits and wish to reach a compromise
reflecting those assessments rather than incur the necessary risk and
expense of litigation, there is no reason (absent an overriding social
interest in the outcome) 21 to prevent their doing so. Moreover, such
factors as the possibility of providing plaintiff benefit without the
defendant's suffering commensurate detriment may cause the parties
to prefer settlement to litigation. In these cases compromise is desirable, and the saving of judicial time and energy provides additional
justification. However, when cost and burden are the operative factors causing a party to accept a compromise which he regards as
fundamentally unjust, the litigation system has seriously failed. The
court's participation in achieving such a result in the name of clearing calendars is even more deplorable.
The justification of severance lies in the increased ability of a party
to afford litigation and consequently, in the diminished importance
of cost and burden in negotiating compromises. The easiest example
is the case of a defendant who believes he has a meritorious defense.
If he can obtain a prompt determination, without first being subjected to the cost and burden of discovery, other pretrial proceedings,
and an overall trial with respect to all issues, then it will be possible
to have his position vindicated through litigation. However, if his
defense will be heard only as part of an overall trial preceded by
21. Some settlements are submitted for approval. See Commonwealth Edison Co.
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 225 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 203
(7th Cir. 1964) (compromise of treble damage action under the antitrust laws);

Burge v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. App. 2d 608, 262 P.2d 6 (1953)
(exemplifying practice of obtaining court approval of compromise in action brought
on behalf of infant); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (requiring approval of compromises in class
actions).
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discovery and other pretrial proceedings on all issues, he may have
no choice except to compromise, despite his absolute conviction that
ultimately his defense would be sustained. Consequently, the content of that compromise could depend very much on defendant's appraisal of the total cost in litigating all issues to a conclusion.
Although perhaps less common, similar benefit can be afforded a
plaintiff as, for example, in the instance where the plaintiff himself
is concerned that his claim may be totally defective in one respect.
In such an instance a plaintiff would want to obtain a determination
before investing the necessary time and money to establish his entire
case. 22 Here, by directing severance and separate trial, defendant is
denied the compromise leverage of the expense plaintiff will have to
incur before resolving his uncertainty.
Severance may be beneficial to plaintiff in another more fundamental respect. If he is proceeding on alternative theories and wishes
them kept together through the preliminary stages, he may gain a real
advantage if one of the theories (and perhaps such defenses as may
be relevant to it) is severed for early trial, and all other proceedings
are stayed. There seems to be no precedent for severance in this situation. One such case, however, would seem to be the common situation in which a plaintiff, aggrieved by a sale of securities, is pro23
ceeding on the theories that (1) the securities were not registered,
(2) the sale was unlawful under the various fraud analogues contained
in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934,4 and (3) common law fraud. Although the claim of the sale
of unregistered securities may involve substantial issues of fact precluding summary judgment, such as whether there was a "distribution" or "public offering"25 or whether the sale occurred within the
one-year limitation period, 2 these issues are nevertheless substantially
less complicated than the question of fraud or its statutory analogues.
If plaintiff can limit discovery to the claim of a sale of unregistered
securities and can obtain an immediate trial on that issue without incurring the expense of exploring and trying the fraud issues, the saving in time and effort can be substantial. This case may perhaps rep22. Rickenbacher Transp., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 3 F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)
(plaintiff moved for prior trial of liability where proof of damages extremely expensive
and complex); Tudor v. Leslie, 35 F. Supp. 969 (D. Mass. 1940) (plaintiff moves for
prior determination of citizenship issue on which diversity jurisdiction depends); Williams v. Donyluk, 66 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1946), appeal dismissed, 90 N.Y.S.2d
125 (App. Div. 1949) (plaintiff moved for separate trial of reformati6n defense).
23. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5, 12(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77L (1964).
24. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11(a), 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77L, 77q
(1964); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
25. Securities Act of 1933, § 4, 15 U.S.C. 77d (1964).
26. Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964). Athas v. Day, 186 F.
Supp. 385, 388 (D. Colo. 1960), illustrates the factual issues involved in this question.
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resent a particular instance of a class of cases of real and growing
significance. When a remedy which is fashioned upon generalized risk
distribution and an older remedy which is predicated upon a conception of fault continue to exist side by side, severance and prior
trial of the simple theory may often be appropriate. Implied warranty and negligence claims in product liability cases appear to be
another example of this phenomenon.
It should be noted that the approach advocated in this article will
not always be consistent with the purpose of alleviating calendar congestion. It may be that severance will permit a party, who might
otherwise settle to avoid the expense of the overall litigation, to choose
instead to litigate limited issues. If this happens, the result should
be applauded regardless of the consequences to the state of the calendar. However, fewer compromises will not necessarily result since
many factors work to produce compromises. Severance only affects
one of these factors-cost and burden-and, of course, it by no means
completely eliminates cost and burden as a factor causing compromise.
The discussion so far has dealt with the benefits of severance both
in achieving less costly litigation and in promoting compromises more
responsive to the parties' evaluations of the merits. The focus has
been on the effect of the possibility of a limited dispositive trial on the
conduct of the litigants. But one must also consider the possible
consequences of the entire litigation becoming more burdensome if
the first trial is not dispositive.
The proposed statute (discussed in part II (c) seeks to minimize
this risk. In any event, even if some duplication of effort occurs, it
is not an important factor mitigating against the use of severance because the possibility of greater overall cost does not seem to be a
significant factor in compromise deliberations. A party evaluating
his compromise position in the face of an order severing limited,
potentially dispositive issues is likely to concentrate on the probable
outcome of the first trial rather than on the possible overall increase
in cost if the trial is not dispositive. When the first trial is not dispositive, its outcome is a far more significant factor than the possibility of greater overall cost, because the winner has survived and
has eliminated some very troublesome contentions. He is, therefore,
not unduly troubled about the overall greater expense. The loser has
had a chance to prevail on limited issues, and his defeat is considerably more important to him than the greater overall cost of the litigation. However, in contrast, the potential saving from severance
manifests itself at precisely the time when the overall cost factor might
well play a predominant role in the parties' compromise deliberations.
In sum, then, it seems that whenever there are potentially dispositive or delimiting issues whose resolution requires the consideration
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of a substantially narrower factual record than would a determination
of all the issues posed, severance and early trial is warranted so that
the potential cost of litigating all issues is eliminated as a predominant
factor in shaping a compromise. As a secondary consideration only,
severance may also serve to alleviate calendar congestion.
C. The Proposed Solution
The proposed statute that follows proceeds from this basic policy
consideration and is designed to achieve the following related objectives:
(1) The standard of substantial potential saving is articulated in
practical terms. Although the formulation accords with the result
actually reached in a great many cases, it serves to emphasize the
practical ends which can be accomplished through severance and to
dispel the confusion created by the restrictive statements contained
in many of the authorities.
(2) By making specific the availability of a stay of all proceedings
other than with respect to the severed issues, the statute emphasizes
that the severance device can be a means of achieving economy not
only with respect to the trial iself but also with respect to the protracted pre-trial proceedings which now form so large a part of the
total litigation burden. Although this result is also supported by authority, the instances in which severance has been accompanied by a
stay of discovery have been infrequent, and there may be some lack of
awareness on the part of the bar that such a result can be achieved.
(3) In the event that there is a significant potential duplication
as well as a substantial possible saving, the court can attempt to realize the benefits of the saving while minimizing the detrimental consequences of potential duplication. This is accomplished by permitting
the court to condition the grant of the severance motion upon the
moving party's waiver of trial by jury. The other party, who is confronted with the possibility of having to participate in a proceeding
which is potentially longer by reason of severance, thus has the option
of avoiding that added burden by joining in the waiver of jury trial.27
The case may be tried in segments before a judge who need not
rehear the evidence offered at the first hearing which may also be
relevant to issues litigated at the second hearing.
The court is also provided with the alternative of directing severance, but with a trial of all issues before a single jury. This alternative
has the disadvantage of precluding a stay, of discovery proceedings,
for if a case is to be tried consecutively in segments before the
27. However, it should be noted that if one of several parties having a common
position on a severed issue refuses to waive jury trial, the option is not available to

the others.
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same jury, the entire matter must be ready for trial at the same
time. It is therefore not possible to conclude the first hearing and
then engage in discovery with respect to the second hearing only if
it should prove necessary. If, however, the saving from the stay of
all pre-trial proceedings other than with respect to the severed issues
is not a major factor, the court may adopt this alternative so as to
avoid the necessity of putting the party objecting to severance in the
position of having to choose between a potentially longer proceeding
and waiver of trial by jury. However, neither alternative imposes an
undue burden upon the parties.
The proposed statute is as follows:
(A) At any time any party may move for an order directing
that: (1) any issue or issues be severed; (2) all proceedings except those relating to the severed issue or issues be stayed until
the completion of the trial of the severed issue or issues; (3) only
certain pretrial proceedings shall be had with respect to the
severed issue or issues; (4) the severed issue or issues shall be
tried promptly after the completion of such pretrial proceedings;
and (5) the parties shall take such other action as the Court may
deem appropriate to expedite the conduct of such proceedings
as may be necessary to bring the action to a conclusion.
(B) Severance shall be directed and appropriate, implementing relief, authorized under subparagraph (A), shall be granted
if the Court decides: (1) that all proceedings, including trial,
with respect to the severed issue or issues will be substantially
less protracted than all such proceedings with respect to the entire
action; and (2) that there is a substantial possibility that the
severed issue or issues will be determined so as (a) to be
dispositive of the entire action, or (b) to limit substantially the
issues remaining to be determined.
(C) In the event that there is signficant duplication between
the proof that will be adduced in the trial of the severed issues
and that which will have to be adduced if the remaining issues
are tried, the Court may: (1) condition the grant of the motion
on the moving party waiving his right to trial by jury on all issues
and upon such waiver, and, with the consent of all other parties
otherwise entitled to trial by jury, direct that a single judge shall
sit for all purposes in the action, or (2) direct that all proceedings
preliminary to trial shall be completed and first the severed issues
and then, if necessary, the remaining issues be tried to a single

jury.
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Notwithstanding the overriding considerations discussed below, this
statute provides a sound resolution of the policy issues underlying
the severance question. These competing considerations will now
be discussed.
III. POSS1r3E OVERRMING CONSIDERATIONS

As previously indicated, the basic idea that severance is undesirable
because it deprives judge and jury of the opportunity to "temper"

the substantive law, underlies the objections to severance as a deprivation of right to trial by jury and as an improper intrusion into
matters of state substantive law in diversity cases where state law
would preclude severance. Beyond this, any jurisdiction which desires to preserve the "tempering" function is certainly free to do so
as a matter of policy.
Both the jury trial objection? and the federal intrusion objection29
have been unanimously rejected by the federal courts. The majority
of state courts have likewise rejected the jury trial objection. 30 As a
matter of precedent then, the matter appears to be well settled. The
28. Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965); Swofford v.
B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965);
Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
814 (1961); O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill.
1960). See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961). Two courts have expressly left open the question of
whether trial to separate juries might be a deprivation of the right to jury trial. Hosie
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., supra at 642; Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., supra at 26.
But see O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., supra at 585, expressly sustaining the
practice and 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 943,

at 191 (Wright ed. 1961), taking the same view.
29. Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965); Lumbermens
Mutual Cas. Co. v. Bell, 289 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1961).
30. Knight v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 268 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); Smith v.
Western Pac. Ry., 144 App. Div. 180, 128 N.Y.S. 966 (1911), aff'd, 203 N.Y. 499,
96 N.E. 1106 (1911); Legare v. Urso, 216 A.2d 506 (R.I. 1966) (semble); Brown
v. General Motors Corp., 67 Wash. 2d 278, 407 P.2d 461 (1965); see Raggenbuck v.
Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d 327, 325 P.2d 258 (1958). A number of states which employ
severance have not explicitly passed on the jury trial objection. See cases cited notes
10 & 11 supra. Contra, Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Mfg. Co., 209 Tenn. 534, 354
S.W.2d 464 (1962); Winters v. Floyd, 51 Tenn. App. 298, 367, S.W.2d 288 (1962).
Texas, although permitting severance in many instances, has adopted, on non-constitutional grounds, a general rule against severance of liability and damage issues in
personal injury actions. Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648 (1958).
Peasley v. Quinn, 373 Mich. 222, 128 N.W.2d 515 (1964), rejects the constitutional
objection but adopts a strong general policy similar to the Texas view. Swofford v.
Glaze, 206 Ga. 574, 57 S.E.2d 823 (1950), holding it error to try separately a release
defense likewise does not refer to the constitutional objection, but appears to reflect a
general policy against severance. The state cases upholding against constitutional attack
reversal and retrial limited to certain issues also support the constitutionality of the
severance practice. Adams v. Hildebrand, 51 Cal. App. 2d 117, 124 P.2d 80 (1942);
Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Scott, 108 Miss. 871, 67 So. 491 (1915); Robinson v. Payne,
99 N.J.L. 135, 122 A. 882 (1923).
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question has, however, assumed new importance by the apparent
recognition of these objections by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules :-The question is at least of sufficient weight to preclude a
clear legislative rejection at the present time. As part of the unification of admiralty and civil procedure that marked the recent amendment to the Federal Rules, a single rule on severance for admiralty
and other civil cases was formulated. The draft was prepared by the
Admiralty Committee and was designed to approve the admiralty
practice of regularly severing liability and damage issues (coupled
with the availability of interlocutory review from the liability ruling).
At the insistence of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, however,
the amendment was carefully couched so as to take no position with
respect to severance in civil actions. 31 The committee cites as explanation for its reluctance to deal decisively with the severance question an
article by Professor Weinstein which is highly critical of the practice
of customarily severing liability and damage issues in personal injury
actions. His criticism was based principally on the ground that
the jury's role in "tempering" the avowed tort principles forms an
essential part of the state "substantive" law which must be applied
in diversity cases. 2 Presumably the committee did not intend to
adopt Professor Weinstein's theoretical position since, if it had, no
rule should have been enacted for diversity cases and the matter left
entirely to state law. What apparently did move the committee was
the underlying policy argument advanced by Professor Weinsteinthat the jury's "tempering" role must be preserved. This interpretation is confirmed by an article recently published by a member of the
Advisory Committee who took strong issue with the wisdom of severing liability and damage issues in personal injury actions because of
its effect on the verdicts rendered. Apparently the number of instances where the jury found no liability increased, presumably because jury sympathy was not aroused by the evidence of plaintiff's

injuries. 3

The Advisory Committee notwithstanding, it seems that the cases
rejecting the two objections are sound both as a matter of authority
and policy. The principle is well settled that the constitutional right
to trial by jury does not require the preservation of the precise form
of common law trial so long as the role of the jury is retained in deciding all issues of fact.- Moreover this principle has been applied by
31. Notes of Advisory Committee, FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1966).
32. Weinstein, supranote 3.
33. Wright, supra note 8.

34. See cases sustaining summary judgment procedure collected in 6 J. MooRE, FED56.06 (2d ed. 1965). In Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10
(1920), the Court said: "The command of the Seventh Amendment that 'the right

ERL PRACTiCE
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the Supreme Court to reject a jury trial objection in the closely
analogous case of reversal and direction of a partial new trial.35
In addition, the practice of trying all issues at a single trial before
a single jury was by no means the only one employed at common
law.- Finally, there is a lack of any evidence indicating that the
tempering function of the jury was ever advanced by a common law
court as a ground for deciding how to order the trial of issues.
Although the question is somewhat more difficult, it is submitted
that the cases denying the objection of federal intrusion into state
substantive law are likewise correct. However, the notion should
be rejected that the matter can be simply disposed of on the ground
that regulation of the function of the jury is entirely a matter of
federal law under the federal constitutional requirement of trial by
jury. Herron v. Southern Pacific Co.,3 7 could be read to go this far.
However, several factors cast doubt on whether such a sweeping generalization was the real basis of decision. First, Herron was a preErie case whose validity is impaired to the extent it relied on the
Swift v. Tyson38 view of the federal courts' role in determining
governing substantive law in diversity cases. Second, in Herron the
federal constitutional provision was not neutral since depriving a
party of the right to a directed verdict was regarded as a violation
of the seventh amendment. 39 Third, interpreting Herron in Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op.,40 the Court considered the state interest in
having the matter decided by a judge and concluded that there was
of trial by jury shall be preserved' does not require that old forms of practice and
procedure be retained . . . .New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution
to present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in the administration of
justice." See James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963),

demonstrating that the availability of jury trial at common law did not reflect only or

even principally a judgment as to the desirability of disposing of the case in this

manner. A whole host of historical factors were operative in determining legal and
equitable jurisdiction.
35. Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931); followed in
Thompson v. Camp, 167 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 824 (1948).
36. Issues of fact raised by pleas in abatement (where tempering could have been

important) were tried separately at common law. Moreover, the defendant could
obtain a trial of the issues relevant to the plea in abatement only on pain of relying

solely on the defense. Greer v. Young, 120 Ill.
184, 190, 11 N.E. 167, 170 (1887);

Jericho v. Underhill, 67 Vt. 85, 30 A. 690 (1894); B. SmPMAN, ON COMMON LAw
PLrADiNG 402 (3d ed. 1923). The equity practice, insofar as it provided for a separate

trial and foreclosure of defendant if unsuccessful, was the same. Kennedy v. Creswell,
101 U.S. 641, 644 (1879).
37. 283 U.S. 91 (1931). Herron held that a federal judge in a diversity case could
direct a verdict on the ground that contributory negligence was established as a matter

of law notwithstanding a state constitutional provision requiring the issue to go to the

jury.
38. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
39. The Court cited the earlier case of Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
40. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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"nothing to suggest that this rule [leaving the issue in question to the
judge] was announced as an integral part of the special relationship
created by the state statute."41 Presumably, then, if the state jury
practice was a fundamental part of the regulatory scheme, its adoption
by the federal court might be required, at least absent an overriding
federal concern. Such concern would not be present simply because
the role of a jury was involved.
The Court was, of course, confronted with the Dice42 case which
held that a state court enforcing a right created by the Federal Employers' Liability Act must afford a jury trial on the issue of whether
a release had been obtained by fraud because the right to trial by
jury was considered "a substantial part of the rights accorded by the
Act." Thus, the possibility of a legislative designation of a right to
trial by jury (not even explicit in Dice) being characterized as
"substantive" in the context of Federal-state choice of law was treated
by the Court as a real one with which it had to deal.
It is submitted that if the state rule denying severance were a
significant part of the state's regulation of the activity in question,
and that interest outweighed the federal interest in severance, then
state law might well have to apply.43 This would certainly be conceivable if the state practice gave the jury more power and did not
offend any principle embodied in the seventh amendment.
However, state decisions denying severance do not rest on the
ground that the tempering function is an essential part of the regulatory scheme. The most difficult case is admittedly the personal injury
action where it may indeed be true that the jury reflects doubt on
liability by compromising on damages. Legislatures may have relied
on this practice as ameliorating the severity of the contributory negligence rule. It may also be true that this is an unarticulated premise
explaining some of the cases which deny severance. However, unless
the state is prepared to adopt a clearly stated rule, there seems to be
no necessity for federal court speculation concerning unexpressed state
policy. Moreover, the articulated state grounds are procedural either
in the classic sense (that is, a single trial is a simpler and more
comprehensible means of resolving a dispute) or in the historical
41. Id. at 538. Subsequent cases have re-emphasized that Byrd rests on the judgment that the state choice in assigning the issue to judge rather than jury was not
an essential part of the regulatory scheme. Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc.,
360 U.S. 273, 278 (1959) (state practice left question of "employee" status upon
which workman's compensation coverage depended to judge); Empire State Ins. Co.
v. Chafetz, 302 F.2d 828, 830 n.4 (5th Cir. 1962) (applied state practice assigning
determination of attorney's fees to judge).
42. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
43. See Empire State Ins. Co. v. Chafetz, 302 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1962).
44. This is the rationale of the Texas view coupled with an anomaly which might
be created since partial new trials are not permitted. Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362,
311 S.W.2d 648 (1958).
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sense (that is, the particular type of severance in question did not
exist at common law).45
On the other hand, the federal interest is considerable. While a
right to the most economical justice may not be afforded by the Constitution, it is certainly a matter of genuine importance. Moreover,
secondary interests may be involved. Simplicity and comprehensibility
as well as freedom from prejudice may also be achieved when severance is directed. Indeed the very tempering concept (assuming the
wisdom of giving effect to this extra-legal discretion) is essentially intraditional role of judge and jury in
consistent with the avowed
46
deciding a controversy.
The recent Hanna4 7 case, in which a new test of determining when
the Federal Rules rather than state law is to be applied, clearly struck
a balance, emphasizing the importance of the federal interest in making the federal courts a forum well conceived to reach a just result.
The Cout stated that a Federal Rule will be sustained if it regulates
matters which "are rationally capable of classification as either [substantive or procedural]." Clearly, under this view there is warrant
for granting the federal courts freedom to devise their own severance
rules to the end of providing economical and informed dispositions
of controversies.
Having disposed of the suggested doctrinal compulsions to honor
the tempering function, all that remains is the resolution of the question as an open choice of policy. This writer's decision is an easy
one. A legal system can and should, through legislative reform and
enlightened judicial decision, strive to fashion substantive rules that
are responsive to all significant policy considerations present in a
particular case. Neither judge nor jury should function as a source
of ad hoc normative judgments, which depart from the result dictated
by the substantive law. If a matter is relevant under the governing
law, it, of course, must be included with the issues severed for early
trial. However, it is not necessary that judge or jury be apprised of
all the facts in the entire litigation in order to reach a decision which
"tempers" substantive law.4
What must also be appreciated is that if the tempering objection
has any force, it will apply to virtually all cases where considerations
of economy warrant severance. So far, those advancing the argument
45. This is the principal reliance of the Tennessee cases cited supra note 30.
46. The elimination of this tempering function (characterized as "prejudice" by

its critics) was one of the purposes of the Northern District of Illinois Rule providing
for severance of liability and damage issues in personal injury actions. O'Donnell v.
Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 581, 585 (N.D. III. 1960).

47. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
48. But see 2 F. HAaPE & F. JMvM, TORTS § 15.5, at 894 (1956); 5 J. MoorE,
FEDEAL PRACTCE ff 49.05, at 2217 (2d ed. 1964).
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have limited their attention to the role of the jury in rendering compromise verdicts in personal injury actions. But in every case which is
suitable for severance the jury will be asked to give effect to some
theoretically controlling policy judgment without hearing the merits.
Affirmative defenses such as release, res judicata and the statute of
limitations are all based on the idea that general considerations require
that recovery be denied without regard to the merits of the particular
controversey. Where a plaintiff may invoke the device effectively, it
may well be because more remote considerations dictate that he prevail in the particular controversy without inquiry into fault. The
liability for sale of unregistered securities referred to earlier is such
a case. Sale of unregistered securities may be an entirely innocent
act, yet policy dictates that it be actionable and that its possible harsh
effect in a particular case not be considered. Jury rebellion at such
a rule is certainly not an inconceivable result, especially if the rule is
presented in the context of an overall case in which the jury concludes
that the defendant has been blameless.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are no doctrinal objections to a flexible and extensive use of
severance. The suggested rule seeks to articulate the criteria that
should govern so that the device may be used to achieve economy in
the litigation process and thus to diminish the importance of cost and
burden as determinants of the result reached in litigation.

